North KoreaÕs efforts to obtain technology related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were recently revealed when two Japan-based traders were convicted for attempting to illegally transport sensitive materials. Historically, North Korea has acquired much of its WMD-related technology and training from abroad, particularly China and the Soviet Union; today, North KoreaÕs procurement networks employ a sophisticated mix of front companies, brokers, and transshipment strategies. Over the last decade, about a half-dozen cases of WMD-related trafficking have surfaced, demonstrating the extent of foreign technology and know-how obtained by North Korea. The countryÕs trafficking threatens international security and the viability of the global efforts to stem the flow of sensitive dual-use technologies. The use of front companies and transshipment destinations reveals a network that is continuously evolving in response to U.N. sanctions and increased nonproliferation-focused export controls in supplier countries like Japan. The convictions are noteworthy in that they are based on JapanÕs Òcatch-allÓ controls, designed to encompass even the most innocuous dual-use items if intended for WMD programs. While North KoreaÕs WMD-related procurement networks continue to evolve, national and regional countermeasures may be able to keep pace, especially if bolstered by multilateral sanctions such as those currently in place against North Korea. JapanÕs export control system reflects what may be an innovative variant of counterproliferationÑone characterized less by traditional military action and more by intelligence gathering, investigative capacity, regional information-sharing, and police action. The authors explore how TokyoÕs efforts may serve as a useful model for other countries seeking to implement effective nonproliferation-related trade controls.
L ast year, when two Japan-based traders were convicted for attempting to illegally transport sensitive materials, a larger story unraveledÑone that illuminated North KoreaÕs efforts to obtain technology related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Historically, the country acquired much of its WMD-related technology and training from abroad, particularly China and the Soviet Union (Pinkston, 2004 (Pinkston, , 2008 .
1 Today, North KoreaÕs procurement networks employ a sophisticated mix of front companies, brokers, and transshipment strategies. Over the last decade, about a half dozen cases of WMD-related trafficking have surfaced, demonstrating the extent of foreign technology and know-how obtained by North Korea (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2006; Crail, 2006; International Export Control Observer, 2006; NIS Export Control Observer, 2004) . Apart from the disruptive effect that the presence of PyongyangÕs WMD and missile programs has on the security of the Korean Peninsula, North KoreaÕs trafficking threatens international security and the viability of global efforts to stem the flow of sensitive dual-use technologies.
Revelations of export violations involving sensitive transfers to North KoreaÑsuch as the 2006 Seishin Enterprises case involving biological weapons"related equipment and the 2008 Tokyo Vacuum case involving nuclear-related equipmentÑcoincided with numerous provocative actions by North Korea, most notably PyongyangÕs nuclear and missile tests in 2006 (International Export Control Observer, 2006 Toki and Lieggi, 2008) . 2 This period was a wake-up call for North KoreaÕs neighbors that changes were necessary in their domestic trade controls in order to stem the flow of sensitive materials to North Korea. In Japan, laws were strengthened, most recently in 2009, and outreach to industry, necessary to improve private sector awareness of export controls, increased.
3 Despite the sophisticated strategies utilized by Pyongyang, such as the use of front companies operating from third countries, JapanÕs export control system has been relatively successful in limiting the flow of domestic dual-use technologies to North KoreaÕs WMD development programs.
North KoreaÕs interest in obtaining these technologies from Japan is nothing new. Since the early 1950s, North Korea has both legally and illegally sought to acquire advanced technology and commodities from Japanese entities to improve its military capability (Kimura and Andou, 2008 . See also Furukawa, 2007) . Illegal export activities from Japan to North Korea have often involved the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chosen Soren), an organization that has sympathetic ties to North Korea and acts as the countryÕs unofficial embassy in Japan. But the roots go even deeper: Chosen Soren also functions as a coordinating body for affiliates such as the Korean Association of Science and Technology (Kakyo), an organization comprised of scientists and engineers of North Korean origin in Japan who have been deeply involved in the procurement network (Furukawa, 2007; Tong-hyoku and Kubota, 2004) .
When Japanese-based traders Li Gyeong Ho of the company Toko Boeki and broker Tadao Morita were convicted in 2009 for their involvement in moving sensitive materials illegally across borders, the cases highlighted how North KoreaÕs illicit network has become adept at modifying strategies in response to increased sanctions and restrictions. Although these cases were not connected, the two traders brokered deals sharing numerous commonalities, including interactions with entities linked to the North Korean government. Considered together, the cases demonstrate that PyongyangÕs WMD-related procurement network aggressively seeks Japanese dual-use technologies. The violations also depict PyongyangÕs evolving illicit trafficking methods aimed at circumventing export controls in Japan and elsewhere. (Hibbs, 2009; Inoue, 2010) . Also similar to the Khan network, the North Korean trafficking network uses front companies, trusted middlemen, safe transshipment points, and dual-use commodities that are not necessarily included on export-control listsÑcommon threads that weave through the cases involving Toko Boeki and Tadao Morita.
Case studies of North Korean trafficking efforts
The export violation incidents in Japan involving Toko Boeki and Tadao Morita occurred after the U.N. Security Council passed resolutions in July and October 2006 sanctioning North Korea, and after Tokyo consequently expanded its list of items under embargo to Pyongyang. Both cases were also investigated and prosecuted after Japan began to strengthen its export controls, and it is notable that the prosecution of these cases relied on the enforcement of JapanÕs Òcatch-allÓ controls, which mandate a license requirement for certain destination countries if an export is likely to support development of WMD, even if the item is not specifically mentioned on domestic control lists. These cases not only serve as a tool to interpret the current state of the trafficking network, but they also reveal the potential impact of multilateral sanctions.
Toko Boeki
In Although Myanmar was the intended destination of both exports, the evidence, which was gathered during the police investigation, pointed to companies linked to the North Korean government as coordinators of the shipments.
Police investigation of Toko BoekiÕs exporting history yielded additional concerns. The company had exported to Myanmar cylindrical grinders (a versatile tool that can also be used to produce magnets for missile-related gyroscopes or nuclear-related uranium centrifuges) and LCR meters (devices, commonly used with magnetometers, that can help confirm the suitability of magnets specific to missile or enrichment applications); again, authorities found evidence linking these shipments to North Korean WMD development.
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Of particular concern was a November 2008 export of a compact cylindrical grinder to MyanmarÕs Ministry of Industry-2, a government organization formerly linked to MyanmarÕs Atomic Li pleaded guilty and received a prison sentence of two years, matching the request of the prosecutors. However, the sentence was suspended for four years, highlighting JapanÕs problem with lenient sentences for proliferation-related offenses. Additionally, LiÕs company, Toko Boeki, was fined about $68,000 (6 million yen), slightly less than the $80,000 (7 million yen) sought by the prosecution (Japan Economic Newswire, 2009c; Lieggi and Toki, 2007) . Katsuki, Riken DenshiÕs president, was also fined approximately $11,000 (1 million yen) (METI, 2010b) . In addition to the criminal penalties, METI imposed a complete sevenmonth export ban on both Li and his company. Riken Denshi also received a METI administrative penalty completely banning the company from exporting for one month (METI, 2010b) . At the time of this writing, no reports have surfaced regarding penalties for Taikyo Sangyo or its president, Muto.
Tadao Morita
In Morita had received an e-mail with instructions to obtain four types of reagent for export to North Korea. Reportedly, he suspected that the e-mail originated from one of a number of North Korea"linked traders whom he met during a business trip to Shenyang, China, so he did not respond to the e-mail, which triggered multiple follow-up e-mails pressing for his support in securing the reagents In January 2010, six months after MoritaÕs criminal conviction, METI also imposed a 16-month export ban on Morita and his company (METI, 2010a) . Similar to the Toko Boeki case, the transactions coordinated by Tadao Morita involved front companies linked to North Korea, the attempted use of third countries as transshipment points, and items with dual-use applications. However, the fact that a trader specializing in used luxury sedansÑ MoritaÕs main businessÑwas contacted to procure tanker trucks and a narrowapplication reagent may indicate that North Korean trafficking networks are having difficulty identifying Japanbased suppliers knowledgeable in scientific and high-technology industries. Moreover, the continued attempts by North Korea"linked entities to contact Morita even after the tanker trucks were seized in Busan further suggests that PyongyangÕs WMD-related networks are facing challenges.
Japanese export controls: Creating roadblocks
Driving these challenges are the numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions aimed at Pyongyang, and the increased efforts of regional powers like Japan to strengthen their nonproliferation trade controls. Since METIÕs 2002 implementation of catch-all controls, the Japanese government has strengthened legal and administrative provisions specific to curbing the spread of WMDÑa process accelerated by North KoreaÕs recent nuclear and missile tests.
Last year, Japan amended its Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade law, which increased the maximum penalty for export control violations from five to seven years. If a violation involves WMD-related items, however, then the maximum penalty is 10 years. The same amendment also broadened the scope of controls on intangible technology transfers, encompassing Òany transfer of sensitive technologies across the border between any persons,Ó likely targeting strategies employed by Chosen Soren and Kakyo for transferring technology. Previously, these controls were limited to transfers between ÒresidentsÓ and Ònon-residentsÓ of Japan. Additionally, METI now has the power to require domestic companies to implement an internal compliance program if they are active exporters of Òsensitive technologiesÓ (METI, 2009 
Characteristics of North Korea's WMD-related trafficking network
The key characteristics that surfaced from both these cases include: the extent to which Chinese entities play a role in North KoreaÕs trafficking, and the effective use of transshipment points to obfuscate the actual end-user. Additionally, North KoreaÕs trafficking network focuses on dual-use technologies not normally on control lists, highlighting the importance of strict catch-all enforcement.
Role of chinese entities in brokering and transshipment
The transactions involving Toko Boeki and Tadao Morita were brokered by firms operating in China. New East InternationalÕs Beijing office issued the original purchase instructions to Toko Boeki, and payment was issued from China by means of another as yet unnamed firm. Korea Paekho 7 concluded its deal with Morita during the traderÕs business trip to China, leading to the attempted export of the tanker truck, the logistics of which were coordinated by Dalian Global in Liaoning Province, which borders North Korea. rail, sea, and air links to the country.
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Dalian is touted by freight forwarders as the ideal transshipment destination for ostensibly commercial business with North Korea. 14 The portÕs highvolume throughput, of course, helps shroud illicit trade. 15 Since the second nuclear test in May 2009, China has made efforts to stem the use of its ports for the transfer of prohibited items to North Korea, including increased customs surveillance that resulted in at least one known seizure of dual-use materials headed to North Korea (Lieggi, 2010) . However, Chinese implementation remains spotty; therefore, Dalian and other points along the China-North Korea border remain important to North KoreaÕs trafficking efforts.
Interest in manufacturing and specialized dual-use technology
The dual-use items at the heart of the Toko Boeki case reveal an interest in dual-use technology that is considerably ÒupstreamÓ in the manufacturing process. Japanese authorities concluded that the cylindrical grinder was intended for the production of magnets, which in turn would be used in gyroscopes for missile guidance systems or centrifuges for uranium enrichment. The magnetometer would support this production as well. With this in mind, the Toko Boeki case underscores the absence of attempts to acquire finished gyroscopes, missile guidance systems, or centrifuge subassemblies. Rather, production or prototyping at the core component level (e.g., magnets) appears to have been the objective.
The reagent inquiry received by Tadao Morita also indicates North KoreaÕs interest in specialized dual-use technology. Four specific reagent types were sought that Òcould measure the balance of electrolytes in the human body, which is disrupted by radiation exposureÓ (Daily Yomiuri, 2009c) . In the case of the tanker trucks, it is notable that the North Korean customer chose to get Japanese trucks despite the fact that trucks manufactured in China would be much more readily exported to North Korea. Technical aspects of Japanese-made tanker trucks are potentially better suited for missilerelated applications than trucks manufactured in China. Satellite imagery referenced by GlobalSecurity.org and the Federation of American Scientists shows the presence of multiple tanker trucks at North Korean missile testing and launch facilities (Federation of American Scientists, 2009; Vick, 1999 Vick, , 2006 .
Use of transshipment and alternate routing strategies
Both the Tadao Morita and Toko Boeki cases involved the use or attempted use of transshipment destinations in a likely effort to conceal the final end-user; attempts to re-route shipments to avoid licensing requirements are visible in both cases. Although China, Myanmar, and Malaysia have been somewhat common transshipment points, the use of South Korea was a unique twist in the Morita case. That move can be best viewed as a desperate attempt by Morita, Dalian Global, or Korea Paekho 7 to engineer a successful transit of the trucks to North Korea. The choice was more likely an effort to exploit South KoreaÕs exemption from JapanÕs catchall controls rather than the first signs of (Albright et al., 2010; Kelley and Fowle, 2010) . Much of this speculation has focused on a scenario in which Myanmar is the end-user of dual-use equipment with WMD applications but receiving North Korean technical assistance. Consistent with this supposition is the compelling analysis by Robert Kelley, a former chief inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency, and researcher Ali Fowle on recent photographs supplied by a defector from MyanmarÕs military (Kelley and Fowle, 2010) . However, the possibility of Myanmar serving as a transshipment point for dual-use equipment ultimately destined for North Korea should not be discounted. Since the two countriesÕ re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 2007, evidence of North Korea-Myanmar military cooperation has accumulated (Ahn, 2010) . Charter or military flights can be used to ferry officials between the two countries, and dual-use equipment could easily be transported aboard such aircraft, similar to how A. Q. Khan reportedly transferred materials to North Korea. Indeed, leaked details of a U.N. sanctions committee report indicated that North Korea was turning to air cargo as its preferred mode of transport for sensitive shipments (Report to the Security Council from the Panel of Experts established Pursuant to Resolution 1874, cited in Lewis, 2010) . Chartered flights of an apparently diplomatic nature would be unlikely targets for interdiction by China or other potential overflight countries. FinallyÑand perhaps most notablyÑthe equipment at the heart of the Toko Boeki case, namely a customized cylindrical grinder and a magnetometer, is clearly more useful and appropriate in the near-to mid-term for North KoreaÕs advanced WMD programs than in any nascent efforts that may or may not be occurring in Myanmar.
Counterproliferation revisited? Staying ahead of the network
The use of front companies and transshipment destinations reveal a network continuously evolving in response to U.N. sanctions and increased nonproliferation-focused export controls of supplier countries like Japan. In the end, these cases resulted in convictions (albeit with unremarkable punishments) and the seizure of dual-use items before they could reach North Korea or any Pyongyang-designated final destination. The convictions themselves are noteworthy in that they are based on JapanÕs catch-all controls, designed to encompass even the most innocuous dual-use items if intended for WMD programs. Successful prosecution under such rules requires Robert Shaw is a research associate and export control instructor in the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at CNS. He previously worked in the private sector for several years, specializing in export control, procurement, and industry compliance.
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